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The aging of populations and the prospect of a rising number of disabled
persons has generated an increasing interest in understanding the causes
and precursors of disability. A perhaps countervailing motivation to un-
derstand disability has been the ﬁnding by some analysts of declining age-
speciﬁc disability rates over the past two or three decades, in the United
States in particular. Declining age-speciﬁc disability rates could moderate
the projected increase in the incidence of disability due to aging popula-
tions.
In contrast to the ﬁnding of declining health disability, there has been an
increase in participation in the Disability Insurance (DI) program in the
United States (see Duggan and Imberman, chapter 11 in this volume). The
participation rate in disability insurance programs has also increased in
some European countries. Moreover, DI participation rates vary dramati-
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of Insurers, is gratefully acknowledged.cally across the industrial countries (Aarts, Burkhauser, and de Jong 1996;
Börsch-Supan 2005). The diﬀerences across countries, however, are almost
surely explained in large part by diﬀerences in the provisions of disability
insurance programs (Gruber and Wise 1999, 2004).
In this chapter, we explore the pathways to disability in the United
States. Our analysis is based on data in the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS). We exploit the rich information in the HRS to shed light on transi-
tions into and out of disability and on the relationship of disability to self-
reported health. We consider health precursors of disability and consider
how disability is related to education and other socioeconomic circum-
stances of individuals. Our hope is that by advancing our understanding of
the precursors and the correlates of disability we will be in a better position
to project future disability rates and to perhaps even understand how the
incidence of disability might be reduced.
By way of introduction to the HRS data, we show the responses to two
questions, one pertaining to disability and the other to health status. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows responses to this question: “Do you have any impairment or
health problem that limits the kind or amount of paid work you can do?”
The ﬁgure shows the steady increase in work-related disability from about
20 percent at age ﬁfty to about 60 percent at age eighty-ﬁve and above.
Figure 4.2 shows the proportion of persons who say they are in poor or
fair health (as distinct from good, very good, or excellent health). By com-
paring ﬁgures 4.1 and 4.2, it can be seen that the HRS data show a close
correspondence between work-related disability and self-reported health.
(The HRS data for the United States diﬀer from European data that show
a divergence between trends in self-reported disability and trends in self-
reported health.1)
To understand health and disability transitions, of course, panel data
like those in the HRS are required. Several avenues of prior work help to
inform our analysis. The most widely used measure of health has been self-
rated health because of its predictive power for the onset of disease and
mortality (Idler and Kasl 1995; Burstrom and Fredlund 2001; Borg and
Kristensen 2000; Hurd, McFadden, and Merrill 2001; Power, Mathews,
and Manor 1998), and because of its wide availability in social science sur-
veys such as the HRS.
Models of health dynamics typically begin with estimation of a ﬁrst-
order Markov transition equation
P(Ht | Ht 1,Xt 1)
where Ht is health status at time t and Xt–1 are covariates that are thought
to inﬂuence the rate of transition of health between t – 1 and t. This rela-
tionship can be estimated on panel data. Separate estimates by age can
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1. See Börsch-Supan (2005).Fig. 4.1 Work-related disability in the Health and Retirement Study
Note: Share of respondents who report a disability which limits their ability to work.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Health and Retirement Study, merged data of
AHEAD, CODA, HRS, and WB cohorts. For cohort and variable deﬁnition, see section 4.2.
Fig. 4.2 Prevalence of poor and fair health in the Health and Retirement Study
Note: Share of respondents who self-assess their health as fair or poor.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Health and Retirement Study, merged data of
AHEAD, CODA, HRS, and WB cohorts. For cohort and variable deﬁnition, see section 4.2.reveal whether the eﬀect of X on the transition probability varies with age.
In prior research, the determinants X of the relationship between socio-
economic status (SES) and health have included income, wealth, educa-
tion, occupation, and social class.2
However, unobserved heterogeneity that has an inﬂuence both on Xand
on Ht conditional on Ht–1 will cause biased estimation of the causal rela-
tionship between Hand X. For example, unobserved heterogeneity may be
traced to diﬀerences in early childhood circumstances. Such diﬀerences
appear to aﬀect the rate of onset of disease later in life (Feinstein 1993;
Goldman 2001; Richards and Wadsworth 2004; Ravelli et al. 1998; Barker
1997). Childhood circumstances are also likely a determinant of SES later
in life.
In models of health transitions, accounting for unobserved heterogene-
ity often produces substantially diﬀerent results from models that do not
account for heterogeneity. For example, Halliday (2005) used the waves of
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1984–1997 to study the
evolution of self-rated health. He distinguished healthy and unhealthy per-
sons and considered their transition probabilities between the states of ill
(self-rated health fair or poor) and well (self-rated health excellent, very
good, or good). He found that the transition rates varied substantially be-
tween the two groups and that the change in the transition rates with age
also varied between the two groups. These diﬀerences led Halliday to con-
clude that investments in childhood health would have substantial health
payoﬀs later in life. Models that do not permit heterogeneity could not
have come to this conclusion.
Contoyannis and Jones (2004) allow unobserved heterogeneity to inﬂu-
ence the choice of healthy and unhealthy behaviors, as well as health status
itself. They ﬁnd that in a model that allows for heterogeneity and controls
for the correlation between behaviors and unobserved health characteris-
tics, the eﬀect of behaviors on health is substantially increased. They con-
clude that “. . . over 75 percent of the total eﬀect of lifestyle on the social
class gradient [in health] is masked when unobserved heterogeneity is ig-
nored” (p. 986).
On the other hand, Michaud and van Soest (2004) consider whether SES
causes health or whether health causes SES, as Adams et al. (2003) had
done. They ﬁnd that controlling for heterogeneity does not substantially
alter their results. But whereas Adams et al. conditioned health and wealth
changes on as many as nineteen health conditions and behaviors, Michaud
and van Soest used a ﬁrst-order Markov model and summarized health by
the ﬁrst-principle component of a large number of health conditions. In es-
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2. Meer, Miller, and Rosen 2003; Smith 2004; Adams et al. 2003; Hurd and Kapteyn 2003;
Wadsworth and Kuh 1997; Marmot 1999; Adda, Chandola, and Marmot 2003; Michaud and
van Soest 2004.timation there is some similarity between ﬁrst-order Markov models that
control for a number of health states and ﬁrst-order Markov models with
unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved health heterogeneity can be at least
partially observed. Indeed, the results of Michaud and van Soest are simi-
lar to those of Adams et al. with respect to the causal ﬂows between SES
and health.
The method used by Halliday (2005) is similar in spirit to the method we
propose in this chapter. Our estimations model, however, sets out a more
complex error structure than his and includes a heterogeneity speciﬁcation
that allows for more extreme levels of health and disability. In addition, we
study an older age group and use data from a diﬀerent time period. We con-
sider higher-order Markov processes and use simulation methods to ex-
plore the implications of heterogeneity.
The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following way. In sec-
tion 4.2 we describe the data and variables that we use. In section 4.3 we
present descriptive data on changes in self-reported health and self-
reported work-related disability during the eight years between the ﬁrst
wave of the HRS in 1992 and the ﬁfth wave in 2000. In section 4.4 we use
data on sequences of self-reported health status to demonstrate that to cor-
rectly model health transitions, it is critical to account for state dependence,
heterogeneity, and classiﬁcation errors in self-reported categorical assess-
ment of health. In section 4.5 we present a model of health transitions based
on a latent (hidden) continuous measure of health. The model allows for un-
observed heterogeneity, state dependence, and classiﬁcation error in self-
reported health and disability. In section 4.6 we present results, through
simulations based on the model. Section 4.7 provides a summary of results
and suggests further analysis based on the model developed in this chapter.
4.2 Data and Variable Deﬁnition
This chapter is based on all four cohort components of the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS):
1. The original HRS cohort, comprising age-eligibles—persons be-
tween ﬁfty-one and sixty years of age at the time of the ﬁrst HRS wave in
1992—plus their (potentially younger or older) spouses. The age-eligibles
therefore represent the birth cohorts born between 1931 and 1941.
2. The AHEAD cohort (Survey of Asset and Health Dynamics of the
Oldest Old), comprising all persons age seventy or older in 1994, at the
time of the ﬁrst AHEAD wave (birth cohorts born before 1923), plus their
spouses.
3. The cohort comprising Children of the Depression Age (CODA),
born between 1924 and 1930 (and their spouses) ﬁlling the gap between the
HRS and the AHEAD birth cohorts.
Pathways to Disability: Predicting Health Trajectories 1094. The cohort of War Babies (WB) was added in 1998 and included per-
sons who became age eligible since the beginning of the HRS in 1992. The
WB cohorts comprise the birth cohorts born between 1942 and 1947.
Respondents were reinterviewed every two years. Attrition due to various
reasons and death were recorded separately, and deaths were ascertained
with the help of the National Death Index. Figure 4.3 shows the age cover-
age of the longitudinal data in each of the HRS cohorts.
Work-related disability and self-reported health are the key outcome
variables in our analysis. Work-related disability is available in all waves for
all cohorts, except for the ﬁrst two waves of the AHEAD cohort (1994 and
1996). Work-related disability is constructed from the question, “Do you
have any impairment or health problem that limits the kind or amount of
paid work you can do?” (See ﬁg. 4.1.)
Self-reported health is available in all waves for all cohorts. It is con-
structed from the question, “Would you say your health is excellent, very
good, good, fair, or poor?” Although ﬁve categorical choices are al-
lowed—excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor—in most of our analy-
ses, we group excellent, very good, and good in one category, and fair and
poor in a second category, as in ﬁgure 4.2.
Work-related disability and self-reported heath are very closely related
in our data. A simple cross-sectional logit regression of work-related dis-
ability on various health measures shows strong associations between 
disability and health. Table 4.1 shows the odds of having a work-related
disability compared to persons who say their health is very good or excel-
lent for the pooled data of wave 1 through 5. For example, persons who say
they are in poor or fair health are 4.53 times as likely to have a work-related
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Fig. 4.3 Longitudinal datadisability as persons who say they are in very good or excellent health. Per-
sons who have an additional IADL are 1.813 times more likely to have a
work-related disability. And so forth.
In addition, a similar logit regression of mortality on lagged disability
and health shows that even after controlling for other health measures,
work-related disability is a strong predictor of mortality, as shown in table
4.2. The table shows that persons who say they have a work-related dis-
ability are 1.76 times more likely to die before the interview for the next
wave than people who say they are in very good or excellent health, even
after controlling for the other measures of health in the regression.
In summary, self-reported work disability as measured in the Health and
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Table 4.1 Work-related disability as function of self-reported health
Odds ratio p-value
Age (splines) — 0.000
Female 0.771 0.000
Number health conditions 1.264 0.000
Number ﬁne motor skills 1.159 0.008
Number gross motor skills 0.791 0.000
Number mobility problems 1.598 0.000
Number large muscle activities 1.513 0.000
Number ADLs 1.235 0.000
Number IADLs 1.813 0.000
Health very good or excellent 1.000 —
Health good 1.944 0.000
Health poor/fair 4.530 0.000
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HRS.
Table 4.2 Work-related disability as predictor of mortality
Odds ratio p-value
Age (splines) — 0.000
Female 0.524 0.000
Disabled 1.760 0.000
Number health conditions 1.254 0.000
Number ﬁne motor skills 1.011 0.874
Number gross motor skills 1.024 0.754
Number mobility problems 1.210 0.000
Number large muscle act. 0.813 0.000
Number ADLs 1.014 0.842
Number IADLs 1.220 0.000
Health very good or excellent 1.000 —
Health good 1.310 0.005
Health poor/fair 2.146 0.000
Source: HRS cohort.retirement study is strongly related to future longevity. This relationship is
unlikely to hold in all countries, in particular those where the underlying
health of the population is close to that of the United States, but a much
larger fraction of older people are receiving beneﬁts from a disability pro-
gram. For example, there is a very limited correlation between work-
related disability and self-reported health as reported in the German
Socio-Economic Panel.3
4.3 Health Transitions in the HRS: From 1992 to 2000
In this section, we present descriptive data on health and disability tran-
sitions. These descriptive data, as well as the data in the next section, are
intended to inform the more formal analysis in sections 4.4 through 4.6 and
to motivate the econometric speciﬁcation that underlies that analysis.
Respondents in the ﬁrst wave of the HRS in 1992 were between ﬁfty-one
and sixty-one years of age. Table 4.3 shows transitions by self-reported
health status. About 78 percent of respondents reported that they were in
good health or better (excellent, very good, good) and 22 percent were in
fair or poor health. Eight years later, their health had deteriorated, with
only 68 percent of the respondents reporting that they were in good or bet-
ter health and 22 percent reporting that they were in fair or poor health; 10
percent had died (excluding persons who were no longer in the sample—
attrition). The table also shows that the transition to poor or fair health
and the transition to death vary enormously by health status in 1992. For
example, of those who were in good or better health in 1992, only 11 per-
cent were in poor or fair health in 2000 and only 5 percent had died. Of
those who were in poor or fair health in 1992, over 43 percent stayed in
poor or fair health in 2000 and almost 21 percent had died.
Table 4.4 shows transitions by self-reported disability status. The transi-
tions between 1992 and 2000 are very similar to the self-reported health
transitions. That is, the transitions for those who report a work disability
are very similar to those who report that they are in fair or poor health, and
the transitions for those who report no work disability are very similar to
those who say that they are in good or better health. In addition, the share
reporting work-related disabilities in 1992 is almost identical to the share
reporting poor or fair health in 1992 (78.73 percent compared to 78.17 per-
cent). (Attrition rates show little correlation with initial health status or
with initial work disability status.)
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show transition rates by health status, by age in 1992,
and by gender. Transition rates by health status are in table 4.5 and by dis-
ability status in table 4.6. These tables show, as expected, that death rates
are substantially higher for men than for women. For example, of men who
report that they are disabled in 1992, over 23 percent have died by 2000,
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3. Börsch-Supan (2001).whereas of women who report they are disabled in 1992 only about 16 per-
cent have died by 2000. Again, these detailed data show a striking rela-
tionship between health status and death rates at all ages, and between dis-
ability status and death rates at all ages. For example, for men age sixty-one
who reported that they were disabled in 1992, over 38 percent had died by
2000; for those who reported that they were not disabled, only about 8 per-
cent had died by 2000.
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the progression of health status and disability
status over the ﬁrst ﬁve waves of the HRS. Each table has three panels: One
for persons who were age ﬁfty-one in 1992, one for persons age sixty-one,
and one panel for all ages in 1992. Each panel shows data for men and for
women separately. Table 4.7 shows progression of health status, by health
status in 1992; table 4.8 shows progression of disability, by disability status
in 1992. For each combination of age in 1992, health or disability status in
1992, gender, and health or disability status in 2000, there are four values.
The four values are for health or disability status in wave 2, wave 3, wave 4,
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Table 4.3 Eight year transitions for self-reported health in the HRS
Status in 2000
Health good Health poor
Status in 1992 or better or fair Dead Attrition Total
Health good or better 6,052 1,037 465 1,506 9,060
66.8 11.45 5.13 16.62 100
Health poor or fair 511 1,090 526 403 2,530
20.2 43.08 20.79 15.93 100
Total 6,563 2,127 991 1,909 11,590
56.63 18.35 8.55 16.47 100
Source: Authors’ calculations from HRS.
Note: Italic font denotes percentages. 
Table 4.4 Eight year transitions for work-related disability in the HRS
Status in 2000
Status in 1992 Not disabled Disabled Dead Attrition Total
Not disabled 5,735 1,295 500 1,551 9,081
63.15 14.26 5.51 17.08 100
Disabled 517 1,094 490 352 2,453
21.08 44.60 19.98 14.35 100
Total 6,252 2,389 990 1,903 11,534
54.2 20.71 8.58 16.5 100
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HRS.
Note: Italic font denotes percentages. T
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.and wave 5 of the HRS. The wave 5 values correspond to the eight years
transitions between 1992 and 2000.
For example, consider the progression of health in table 4.7 for men who
were age sixty-one in 1992 and in good or better health. The progression of
the proportion that reported they were in good or better health over the
next four waves of the HRS are shown in the top row of numbers for men.
The proportion in good or better health was .87 in the second wave, .82 in
the third wave, .70 in the fourth, and .67 in the ﬁfth wave.
In almost all cases, there is a consistent decline in the proportion in good
or better health. And there is a consistent increase in the proportion that
has died. On the other hand, the proportion in fair or poor health does not
follow a consistent pattern. The reason is the relationship between death
and health status. For example, consider men of all ages who were in fair
or poor health in 1992 (see table 4.7). The proportion that had died in-
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Table 4.7 Progression of health status by 1992 status, by age and sex
Male, wave: Female, wave:
Health 1992 Status 23452345
Initial age = 51
Good+ Good+ 0.874 0.824 0.700 0.674 0.854 0.795 0.695 0.703
Fair– 0.056 0.065 0.126 0.109 0.100 0.105 0.156 0.103
Dead 0.003 0.012 0.018 0.029 0.000 0.010 0.021 0.028
Attrition 0.068 0.100 0.156 0.188 0.046 0.090 0.128 0.167
Fair- Good+ 0.356 0.315 0.192 0.178 0.293 0.337 0.174 0.239
Fair- 0.507 0.397 0.438 0.370 0.674 0.543 0.652 0.543
Dead 0.096 0.178 0.219 0.301 0.011 0.043 0.054 0.087
Attrition 0.041 0.110 0.151 0.151 0.022 0.076 0.120 0.130
Initial age = 61
Good+ Good+ 0.832 0.782 0.659 0.637 0.831 0.772 0.685 0.694
Fair– 0.123 0.117 0.173 0.123 0.119 0.132 0.142 0.082
Dead 0.006 0.028 0.050 0.073 0.005 0.009 0.050 0.068
Attrition 0.039 0.073 0.117 0.168 0.046 0.087 0.123 0.155
Fair- Good+ 0.194 0.149 0.179 0.134 0.274 0.226 0.210 0.210
Fair- 0.612 0.507 0.418 0.299 0.597 0.613 0.532 0.452
Dead 0.119 0.224 0.269 0.403 0.081 0.113 0.145 0.210
Attrition 0.075 0.119 0.134 0.164 0.048 0.048 0.113 0.129
Averaged over all ages:
Good+ Good+ 0.840 0.764 0.676 0.644 0.850 0.795 0.708 0.696
Fair– 0.086 0.097 0.131 0.116 0.095 0.099 0.137 0.107
Dead 0.009 0.026 0.042 0.060 0.006 0.014 0.026 0.037
Attrition 0.064 0.113 0.151 0.180 0.049 0.092 0.129 0.160
Fair- Good+ 0.221 0.246 0.181 0.195 0.255 0.284 0.204 0.212
Fair– 0.643 0.502 0.480 0.385 0.655 0.565 0.566 0.482
Dead 0.077 0.145 0.192 0.256 0.041 0.073 0.112 0.154
Attrition 0.059 0.107 0.147 0.163 0.050 0.077 0.118 0.151
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HRS cohort.creased from .08 to .15 to .19 to .26, but the proportion in fair or poor
health declinedfrom .64 to .50 to .48 to .39. The implication is that those in
poor health were more likely to die, so that of those remaining fewer and
fewer were in fair or poor health. This relationship highlights the strong se-
lection eﬀect that disproportionately leaves healthier persons in the sample
as age increases. Similar relationships can be seen for the progression of
disability, as shown in table 4.8.
4.4 Modeling Health Transitions: What are the Diﬃculties?
The tables in section 4.3 show transition probabilities over an eight-year
period and from wave to wave in the HRS. Can these transition probabili-
ties be used to project health and disability status into the future? The ap-
parent relationship between health (or disability) and death revealed in
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Table 4.8 Progression of disability status by 1992 status, by age and sex
Male, wave: Female, wave:
Status 1992 Status 2 3 452345
Initial age = 51
Not disabled Not disabled 0.848 0.767 0.696 0.663 0.860 0.748 0.705 0.640
Disabled 0.082 0.118 0.115 0.103 0.101 0.156 0.149 0.172
Dead 0.009 0.024 0.035 0.053 0.000 0.007 0.017 0.022
Attrition 0.062 0.091 0.153 0.182 0.039 0.089 0.129 0.165
Disabled Not disabled 0.208 0.181 0.208 0.208 0.253 0.176 0.189 0.189
Disabled 0.653 0.542 0.486 0.417 0.680 0.676 0.608 0.554
Dead 0.069 0.125 0.139 0.194 0.013 0.068 0.081 0.135
Attrition 0.069 0.153 0.167 0.181 0.053 0.081 0.122 0.122
Initial age = 61
Not disabled Not disabled 0.840 0.718 0.669 0.630 0.826 0.741 0.676 0.629
Disabled 0.122 0.188 0.177 0.138 0.122 0.165 0.162 0.152
Dead 0.006 0.033 0.055 0.083 0.000 0.009 0.043 0.057
Attrition 0.033 0.061 0.099 0.149 0.052 0.085 0.119 0.162
Disabled Not disabled 0.092 0.108 0.138 0.123 0.206 0.209 0.209 0.250
Disabled 0.692 0.523 0.415 0.277 0.676 0.627 0.522 0.397
Dead 0.123 0.215 0.262 0.385 0.088 0.104 0.149 0.235
Attrition 0.092 0.154 0.185 0.215 0.029 0.060 0.119 0.118
Averaged over all ages:
Not disabled Not disabled 0.836 0.743 0.683 0.626 0.831 0.756 0.690 0.638
Disabled 0.092 0.117 0.122 0.129 0.113 0.135 0.146 0.156
Dead 0.011 0.030 0.047 0.067 0.006 0.015 0.029 0.039
Attrition 0.061 0.109 0.148 0.178 0.051 0.094 0.135 0.167
Disabled Not disabled 0.175 0.185 0.181 0.183 0.183 0.187 0.224 0.221
Disabled 0.684 0.564 0.490 0.415 0.729 0.669 0.570 0.496
Dead 0.069 0.128 0.173 0.231 0.044 0.073 0.109 0.160
Attrition 0.073 0.123 0.155 0.172 0.043 0.071 0.097 0.123
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HRS cohort.tables 4.7 and 4.8 suggests that the answer is no. Those who remain in the
sample are likely to be healthier than those who die. This section demon-
strates this and additional features of the data that must be accounted for
to adequately specify transitions models of self-reported health and work-
related disability. Since most of this section serves to demonstrate the key
issues, most of the presentation pertains to our binary indicator of self-
reported health (good or better versus fair or worse) and to men only.
The transition probabilities from wave to wave in the HRS are shown in
table 4.9, for men who were in good or better health in the ﬁrst wave. The
entries in the table represent the average transition probabilities over all
waves, by initial age. There are 308 observations of men initially aged ﬁfty
in good or better health in waves 1 through 4. Overall, 83.6 percent of them
remain in good health in the subsequent wave, while for 11.2 percent health
deteriorates, 0.3 percent die, and 4.9 percent cannot be interviewed in the
following wave.
An important question is whether these two year transitions can be used
to predict the evolution of health in the long run. A simple estimate of an
eight year transition probability is the two year transition probability
raised to the power four. Using this procedure to estimate health status in
2000, given the health status in 1992 does not work well, however. The re-
sults are shown in table 4.10. The actual proportion of respondents in good
health is substantially greater than the predicted probability at all ages.
The actual proportion in poor or fair health is substantially less than the
simulated probability at all ages.
There are several potential reasons why this procedure predicts actual
probabilities poorly. One reason is the simplistic ﬁrst-order Markov as-
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Table 4.9 Average two year transition probabilities: Men, lagged health = good 
or better
Age (wave 1) Observations Health good+ Poor/fair Dead Attrition
50 308 83.55 11.18 0.33 4.93
51 1,237 85.55 8.13 0.99 5.34
52 1,181 83.79 8.94 1.58 5.70
53 1,226 82.16 11.47 0.84 5.53
54 1,072 84.91 8.08 1.17 5.84
55 1,058 84.18 9.59 1.34 4.89
56 1,110 83.04 10.51 0.83 5.62
57 1,115 84.19 9.47 1.19 5.15
58 941 82.99 11.12 1.64 4.25
59 887 82.26 12.33 1.61 3.80
60 1,051 84.65 8.65 1.85 4.86
61 627 82.77 11.76 1.61 3.86
Total 11,813 83.75 9.91 1.27 5.07
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HRS.sumption that underlies the predictions. State dependence may be more
complicated; the value in wave t may depend on the value not only in wave
t – 1, but on prior waves as well. A second reason is heterogeneity. If there
are two populations, for instance, one intrinsically healthier than the other,
the transition probability averaged over both subpopulations will underes-
timate the proportion in good health after eight years and will overestimate
the proportion in fair or poor health after eight years. In the following dis-
cussion we show descriptive evidence of both state dependence and het-
erogeneity. A third reason is measurement error, in this case misclassiﬁca-
tion of a respondent into the wrong categorical health status. We will also
show descriptive evidence of this problem.
To demonstrate that health outcomes in wave 3 depend on health in
wave 1 as well as wave 2, we show in table 4.11 a complete “tree” of health
status probabilities in waves 1, 2, and 3. These probabilities are based on
513 men who were aged ﬁfty-one in wave 1. The ﬁrst column (wave 1)
simply shows the proportions in good and poor health at wave 1. Column
2 (wave 2) shows the distribution of health status in wave 2, given health
status in wave 1. The third column (wave 3) shows the evidence on state de-
pendence. Health in wave 3 depends not only on health in wave 2, but also
on health in wave 1. For example, 91.25 percent of men who are in good
health in wave 2 and in wave 1 are in good health in wave 3. But only 61.54
percent of men who are in good health in wave 2 and in fair health in wave
1 are in good health in wave 3. Also, 36.84 percent of men who are in good
health in wave 1 and in fair health in wave 2 are in fair health in wave 3. On
the other hand, 59.46 percent of men who are in fair health in both wave 1
and in wave 2 are in fair health in wave 3. That is, health status in wave 3
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Table 4.10 Projection of 1992–2000 health changes based on two year average transition
probabilities—men in good or better health in wave 1
Actual probabilities Predicted probability
Age (wave 1) Good+ Poor/fair Dead Attrition Good+ Poor/fair Dead Attrition
50 0.663 0.128 0.035 0.174 0.617 0.165 0.041 0.178
51 0.674 0.109 0.029 0.188 0.624 0.130 0.058 0.189
52 0.640 0.098 0.063 0.199 0.583 0.142 0.072 0.203
53 0.604 0.150 0.053 0.192 0.553 0.189 0.053 0.205
54 0.649 0.103 0.053 0.195 0.586 0.143 0.065 0.205
55 0.658 0.113 0.053 0.176 0.588 0.163 0.075 0.174
56 0.640 0.131 0.035 0.194 0.580 0.170 0.052 0.199
57 0.650 0.116 0.051 0.183 0.591 0.162 0.067 0.179
58 0.663 0.101 0.086 0.150 0.565 0.189 0.093 0.153
59 0.619 0.135 0.099 0.147 0.561 0.185 0.104 0.150
60 0.643 0.094 0.098 0.165 0.591 0.140 0.103 0.166
61 0.637 0.123 0.073 0.168 0.554 0.183 0.109 0.155
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HRS cohort.depends not only on health in the preceding wave 2, but also on health in
the prior wave 1. Thus a second-order Markov process would describe
these transitions much better than a ﬁrst-order Markov process.
The underlying reason for such state dependence may, however, be pop-
ulation heterogeneity. Indeed, table 4.12 shows the results of a regression
of change of health status between each pair of successive waves on a host
of individual characteristics in the ﬁrst of the two waves. The table shows
the individual characteristics of a substantial eﬀect on the transition. Thus,
substantial heterogeneity is attributable to observed individual character-
istics, suggesting substantial heterogeneity over unobserved characteris-
tics as well. The marital status is interacted with gender; the reference
group is married males. Particularly striking are the estimated coeﬃcients
on the upper and lower wealth and income quartiles. They indicate a sig-
niﬁcantly lower probability of remaining in poor health if a person is in the
top wealth quartile or in the top income quartile.
To see whether these covariates improve the long-run predictive power
of the two year transitions, we use the predicted transition probabilities to
project health status in 2000, beginning with health status in 1992. One
such speciﬁcation is shown in table 4.12. We again compare the predicted
probabilities of the outcomes in 2000 with the actual probabilities. We are
interested in how much closer the predicted probabilities are to the actual
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Table 4.11 Health transitions in the ﬁrst three waves of the HRS cohort, for men age
51 in wave 1
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Good + 82.32 Good + 87.35 Good + 91.25
Poor/fair 5.05
Dead 0.67
Attrition 3.03
Poor/fair 5.59 Good + 47.37
Poor/fair 36.84
Dead 5.26
Attrition 10.53
Dead 0.29
Attrition 6.76
Poor/fair 17.68 Good + 35.62 Good + 61.54
Poor/fair 26.92
Dead 3.85
Attrition 7.69
Poor/fair 50.68 Good + 18.92
Poor/fair 59.46
Dead 13.51
Attrition 8.11
Dead 9.59
Attrition 4.11
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HRS cohort.T
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.probabilities when more individual attributes in the ﬁrst wave are con-
trolled for, in addition to health status in the ﬁrst of the two waves. We used
three speciﬁcations:
• Speciﬁcation (1) includes only age and gender.
• Speciﬁcation (2) is the one shown in table 4.12.
• Speciﬁcation (3) reﬁnes the description of health by adding to speciﬁ-
cation (2) the RAND summary indices for the number of conditions,
and indices of gross and ﬁne motor activities and mobility that signif-
icantly correlate with disability, as shown in table 4.1.
Controlling for initial values of covariates improves the predictions sub-
stantially. Still, even speciﬁcation (3) understates the proportion of persons
who were in poor or fair health in 1992 who are in poor or fair health in
2000. While 44.07 percent of these persons are in poor or fair health in
2000, the predicted percent is only 36.67 percent. However, speciﬁcation
(3) does much better than speciﬁcation (1) or speciﬁcation (2), which con-
trol for fewer individual attributes. Speciﬁcation (3) also predicts much
better than speciﬁcation (1) or (2) the percentage of persons who were in
good or better health in 1992 who are in good or better health in 2000. The
improvement in ﬁt, displayed in the second column of table 4.13, is mea-
sured by the average simulated probability of the observed outcome. Thus,
better control for individual heterogeneity improves the transition predic-
tions substantially.
Finally, we consider misclassiﬁcation error. We assume that underlying
health (or disability) is continuous, ranging from persons with the worst
health to those with the best health. The measure of health status reported
in the HRS, however, is discrete, allowing for ﬁve self-reported categories
(which we often condense even further into only two categories). Measured
disability allows for only two categories. These categories are not precisely
deﬁned. Respondents may therefore misclassify their health or disability
status because they report a diﬀerent category than others who have the
same underlying health status.
Misclassiﬁcations are likely to be particularly frequent in situations in
which true underlying health status is on the borderline between cate-
gories. This may explain sequences that exhibit a frequent back-and-forth
movement from one category to the other (such as 01010 in the binary dis-
ability categories). Another type of misclassiﬁcation is simple error. Se-
quences that show a single deviation from an otherwise constant pattern
(such as 00100) may reﬂect such errors, although they may also indicate for
example, a temporary illness.
Table 4.14 shows the frequencies of each sequence of self-reported
health in the HRS data. In each of the ﬁve waves between 1992 and 2000,
zero represents good or better health, 1 fair or poor health, and x either
death or attrition. The sequences are ordered in descending frequency. The
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.most striking feature of the data is the stability of self-reported health sta-
tus. Almost 45 percent of all respondents reported that their health was
good or better in all ﬁve waves. Another 6.4 percent reported that their
health was fair or poor in all ﬁve waves. Including incomplete histories
(noted by x), 71.3 percent of respondents never changed their self-reported
health status. Another 13.7 percent changed their self-reported health sta-
tus only once, mostly from good or better to fair or poor.
Self-reported health sequences with changes from good or better to fair
or poor, or the reverse, are relatively rare. Thus, these data provide prima
facie evidence suggesting that misclassiﬁcation cannot dominate self-
reported health categorization. Self-reported sequences with three or four
changes make up only 3.7 percent of all sequences. Single-change se-
quences are more frequent, accounting for 6.6 percent of all sequences.
And it is not clear how many of these reﬂect true one-spell illnesses. Thus
we should perhaps be less concerned about errors in the data than about
the reduction in information inherent in the discrete coding of an under-
lying continuous variable.
The sequences also provide some information that helps to distinguish
true state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity. We calculate the
probability of a bad health state in wave 5, conditional on a sequence in the
ﬁrst four waves of the HRS. The data are reported in table 4.15.In this rep-
resentation, we assume that heterogeneity is held constant by conditioning
on the total number of past bad health states, regardless of order. State de-
pendence in this representation is suggested if the sequence of past health
states determines health status in wave 5, but the number of past bad health
states does not determine health status in wave 5.
Thus we ﬁrst order the entries in the table by the number of bad health
states, and then by the number of waves over which the most recent health
state was observed without change. Not surprisingly, the probability of be-
ing in bad health in wave 5 increases with the number of prior bad states.
In addition, there is also a distinct time lag eﬀect: The more recent a bad
health status, the higher the probability of being in bad health in wave 5.
Comparing sequence 1 to sequence 2, we see clearly that even health sta-
tus ﬁves waves earlier aﬀects health status in wave 5. With no prior bad
health states, the probability of bad health in wave 5 is 0.06; if the only
change is that health status ﬁve waves earlier is bad (but good in the subse-
quent three waves), the probability of bad health in wave 5 is increased
from 0.06 to 0.19. This change suggests heterogeneity. The comparison of
sequences 3 with 6 tells the same story. So does the comparison of se-
quences 4 and 7.
Comparison of sequences 2, 3, and 4 shows that, holding the number of
past bad health states constant, the more recent the bad health state the
greater the probability that health status in wave 5 will be bad. This sug-
gests state dependence. Obviously, there is more going on than simple het-
Pathways to Disability: Predicting Health Trajectories 125erogeneity. State dependence may overlay diﬀerences in self-reported
health status due to heterogeneity. Similar conclusions follow from com-
paring sequence 6 to sequence 7, and sequence 7 to sequence 8. In each se-
quence, there are two bad health states. But the more recent the last of
these bad health states, the greater the probability that health status in
wave 5 will be bad. One explanation for this state dependence is a drift in
the underlying continuous health variable that underlies our coarse binary
health indicator. We will return to this issue in our more reﬁned model in
section 4.5.
The number of bad health states (as a measure of heterogeneity) and the
number of waves since the last bad health state (as a measure of state de-
pendence) are close to a suﬃcient statistic for the initial sequences. The
probability of bad health in wave 5 is very closely approximated by these
two measures. Table 4.16 shows logit regression estimates of health status
in wave 5 regressed on these two measures (based on the ﬁrst four waves).
This speciﬁcation cannot be rejected versus a speciﬁcation with a full set of
dummies for the sixteen sequences in table 4.15 (p   0.5409).
Table 4.17 shows the ﬁtted probabilities of bad health in wave 5 based on
the regression above, together with the actual probabilities, for each of the
sequences in table 4.15. It is clear that the ﬁtted values are close to the ac-
tual values.
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Table 4.15 Probability of bad health in wave 5, conditional on sequence of health
states in waves 1 through 4
Initial sequence Frequency Number  Lag since Probability
in waves of initial of past bad last bad of bad health
Number 1 through 4 sequence health states health state in wave 5
1 0000 5,572 0 — 0.06
2 1000 209 1 4 0.19
3 0100 185 1 3 0.21
4 0010 183 1 2 0.28
5 0001 538 1 1 0.38
6 1100 110 2 3 0.38
7 1010 46 2 2 0.39
8 0110 75 2 2 0.51
9 0101 125 2 1 0.55
10 1001 108 2 1 0.61
11 0011 249 2 1 0.61
12 1110 93 3 2 0.58
13 1101 157 3 1 0.61
14 0111 216 3 1 0.73
15 1011 106 3 1 0.73
16 1111 799 4 1 0.90
Total 8,771 0.25
Source: Authors’ calculations from HRS cohort.4.5 An Econometric Model Based on Continuous 
Latent (“Hidden”) Health Status
The descriptive analysis presented in section 4.5 suggests that self-
reported health status in all waves prior to wave 5 contains information
about wave 5 health status. That is, health status in wave 5 depends on
health status in all prior waves. There are at least three explanations for this:
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Table 4.16 Probability of bad health in wave 5 based on summary measures of health status in
the prior 4 waves
Logit estimates Odds ratio Standard error Z P > |z|
Number bad states = 0 1.00 (Reference)
Number bad states = 1 4.06 0.50 11.29 0.00
Number bad states = 2 8.40 1.61 11.11 0.00
Number bad states = 3 11.92 3.17 9.33 0.00
Number bad states = 4 39.24 13.18 10.93 0.00
wave status wave 1 = bad 1.00 (Reference)
wave status wave 2 = bad 1.06 0.15 0.43 0.67
wave status wave 3 = bad 1.44 0.17 2.99 0.00
wave status wave 4 = bad 2.24 0.26 6.85 0.00
Number of observations Log likelihood LR chi2(7) Pseudo R2 Prob > chi2
8,771 –3,049.0437 3,698.25 0.3775 0.00
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the HRS cohort.
Table 4.17 Predicted versus actual probability of health status in wave 5
Sequence in waves 1–4 Actual Predicted
0000 0.061 0.061
0001 0.385 0.372
0010 0.279 0.276
0011 0.606 0.638
0100 0.205 0.219
0101 0.552 0.565
0110 0.507 0.455
0111 0.731 0.727
1000 0.187 0.209
1001 0.611 0.551
1010 0.391 0.441
1011 0.726 0.715
1100 0.382 0.367
1101 0.611 0.649
1110 0.581 0.542
1111 0.897 0.897
Total 0.246 0.246
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HRS cohort.• State dependence: past health states directly aﬀect the risk of a current
(good or bad) state.
• Heterogeneity: past states contain information on individual-speciﬁc
risk that is correlated over time.
• Misclassiﬁcation: categorical coding induces error in self-reported
health status.
Thus to predict future health status, we use an econometric model that ac-
counts for each of these features of the data.4 The key idea is to model true
underlying health status as a continuous latent variable. The categorical
self-assessed indicators of health (or work disability) are determined by
this latent health. The underlying continuous latent health variable is cor-
related over time and thus induces correlation over time in the observed re-
sponses to the categorical self-assessment of health status and disability. In
addition, the probability of death is assumed to depend on the hidden
health measure, thus allowing for correlation between health status and se-
lection into the group of persons who survive from one period to the next.
The key features of the speciﬁcation are illustrated in ﬁgure 4.4.It relates a
categorical self-assessed health indicator y to true latent health h and a set
of observed covariates x.
The diagram describes the evolution of latent heath, the measured health
indicators y, and mortality mover time—in periods 0, 1, 2, and so forth. La-
tent health h depends on observed individual covariates x and on unob-
served individual attributes a, which are correlated over time. In addition to
the random unobserved variable a, which directly inﬂuences h, self-reported
health or disability y, and mortality, depend on two additional stochastic
shocks. One shock, u, represents classiﬁcation error in self-reported health
as well as unmeasured variables that aﬀect self-reported health. Another
shock, e, reﬂects unobserved determinants of mortality.
More precisely, the model used to describe health (or disability) transi-
tions and mortality is represented by the following equations:
(1) Latent (hidden) health:
hiw   xiw  aiw
(2) Unobserved determinants of latent health (heterogeneity):
aiw ∼ N (0, 2
a)
aiw | aiw–1 ∼ N [ t(w)–t(w–1)aiw–1,  2
a(1 –  2[t(w)–t(w–1)])]
(3) Categorical self-reported health measure y:
Pr(yiw   y | xiw, hiw)   Λ( y   hiw   xiw )   Λ( y 1   hiw   xiw )
  Λ[ y   (xiw  aiw)   xiw ]    Λ[ y 1   (xiw   aiw)   xiw ]
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4. Details can be found in Heiss (2005, Ch. 3).(4) Mortality hazard rate:
 it(w)   exp (    hiw)
  exp[   (xiw  aiw)]
(5) Survival probability from HRS wave w - 1 to wave w:
Si[t(w)|t(w   1)]   exp 
 [t(w)   t(w   1)]  
Equation (1) describes the key latent health variable. Latent health of in-
dividual iin wave wis determined by two components: a deterministic part
that is a function of the explanatory variables xiw, and an unobserved com-
ponent aiw which persists from period to period and provides for hetero-
geneity among respondents. The persistence of the unobserved determi-
nant of latent health is described in equation (2). The aiwfollow a ﬁrst-order
autoregressive process deﬁned in continuous time.5 The marginal distribu-
tion of aiwis normal with zero mean and variance  2. Conditional on a pre-
vious realization d time units ago, where d may be continuous, its distribu-
tion is normal with mean  daiw–d and variance  2(1 –  2d). (Simpler
speciﬁcations [such as independent realizations or random eﬀects] can be
speciﬁed as special cases of equation 2.)
The observed categorical self-reported health or work disability re-
sponses are determined by the ordered logit functional form described in
equation (3). The logit probabilities depend on the covariates xiwand on the
latent health measure h—which in turn is also a function of the measured
covariates xiw and the unobserved determinant aiw of latent health (equa-
tion 1)—and by transitory shocks uiw, which are independent and follow a
logistic distribution. The cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the lo-
gistic distribution is Λ(⋅), with  0   –  and  5    . The threshold param-
eters  1through  4are cutoﬀvalues of latent health that indicate the switch
 it(w)    it(w 1)   
 (hiw   hiw 1)
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Fig. 4.4 Modeling a hidden health process
5. An Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.points from one categorical response y to another. They are estimated in
the model. In the case of a binary speciﬁcation, equation (3) reduces to a
simple logit model. Notice that from equation (3) alone, both of the pa-
rameters   and   cannot be identiﬁed. But mortality depends only on the
covariates x through latent health and thus allows separate identiﬁcation
of  , as described next.
Equations (4) and (5) describe the mortality process that induces sample
selection, distinguishing persons who remain in the sample from those who
die and leave the sample. We start with a straightforward formulation of
the mortality hazard rate (equation 4), which depends only on latent health
hiw. We then use an approximation formula to integrate this expression over
time to obtain the survival function (equation 5). The parameters   and  
are estimated.
The underlying health process and the selection process due to mortal-
ity are obviously related. The health change of a typical respondent be-
tween two waves is confounded by the fact that this comparison is possible
only for the relatively healthy who survive from one wave to the next. A
similar problem arises, for example, when back-casting the health at age
ﬁfty of a respondent who was interviewed at age eighty. The fact that a per-
son survived until eighty tells us that he or she was probably healthier than
the average respondent at age ﬁfty.
In our model, the correlation between health and mortality is generated
through latent health h, which in turn depends on observed covariates x
as well as the unobserved component of latent health a. So conditional 
on the covariates x, mortality risk and health are allowed to be correlated
through a. In order to identify the model, we assume that conditional on
the covariates and the unobserved determinants of latent health, the self-
reported health measures and mortality are independent. Hence, once we
know the covariates xa n dlatent health h, there is no additional informa-
tion in the self-reported health measures of an individual that we could use
to make a better prediction of the individual’s life expectancy. Our core
identifying assumption is that all such information is contained in the la-
tent health variable.
The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. Conditional
on the sequence of unobserved persistent health shocks aiw, all calculations
are straightforward—the probabilities of self-reported health are given in
equation (3) and the survival/mortality probabilities are given in equations
(4) and (5). We then integrate over the sequence of health shocks aiw using
Monte-Carlo simulation. Their joint distribution is given by equation (2).
We account for the fact that selectivity through mortality has gone on be-
fore the ﬁrst wave by integrating not over the unconditional distribution of
aiw but over the distribution conditional on survival up to the ﬁrst inter-
view—see ﬁgure 4.7.
This method results in asymptotically eﬃcient parameter estimates if
130 Florian Heiss, Axel Börsch-Supan, Michael Hurd, and David A. Wisecertain regularity conditions hold and the number of replications rises fast
enough with the number of individuals. For details on these simulation
methods see Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994). Alternative simulation schemes
for this and similar models, such as nonlinear ﬁltering, are discussed by
Heiss (2006).
4.6 Results
We have estimated the diﬀerent joint model of the health status and mor-
tality on the ﬁrst six waves (1992–2002) of the HRS (using all four cohorts).
As previously discussed, the health outcomes we consider are the ﬁve cat-
egories of self-reported health (SRH) and the two categories of work dis-
ability (WD).
We begin with a model that includes only age splines. Age enters the la-
tent health equation and the SRH and WD outcome equations. (Age does
not separately enter the mortality equation and latent health enters the
outcome equations with a normalized weight of 1. In this way, the age
eﬀects in the latent health equation are identiﬁed.)
Table 4.18 presents the estimation results for the SRH and WD out-
comes. The unobserved heterogeneity (the standard deviation of a) is sub-
stantial. The standard deviation of a is estimated to be 3.2 in the SRH
model and 4.7 in the WD model. The correlation of a over time is close to
1 in both models, although signiﬁcantly less than 1. The estimated correla-
tion over one year translates into a correlation between values twenty years
apart of 0.7 in the SRH model and 0.5 in the WD model. Consequently, the
hypothesis of no heterogeneity (  0) and the random eﬀects hypothesis
(  1) are rejected. Results from these models can be requested from the
authors.6
4.6.1 Simulations with Age Only
Given the parameter estimates for self-reported health (SRH) and work
disability (WD) shown in table 4.18, we can simulate future paths of sur-
vival and health (and disability) conditional on health earlier in life. This is
done by simulating not over the unconditional distribution of latent health
shocks (a) but over the distributions conditional on survival or observed
health outcomes. Figure 4.7 presents such conditional distributions for
survival up to diﬀerent ages.
The simulated survival rates conditional on survival up to age ﬁfty for
the whole population is shown and compared with the life tables for 1997
(National Center for Health Statistics: National Vital Statistics Report,
Vol. 47, no. 28) in ﬁgure 4.5. Our simulated survival probabilities tend to be
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6. The transitory shocks u in the categorical health equations are normalized to ( / 3  ) ≈
1.8, as is implicit in the logit model.Table 4.18 Estimation results with age only
Self-reported Work
health Standard disability Standard
estimate error estimate error
Latent Health (h):
Standard deviation of a (σ) 3.2411 0.0153 4.6886 0.0429
1-year correlation of a (ρ) 0.9817 0.0006 0.9663 0.0005
Covariates (γ): Age –0.5908 0.0425 –0.4644 0.0141
Age spline 60+ 0.3012 0.0573 0.1424 0.0303
Age spline 70+ –0.0128 0.0443 –0.0436 0.0394
Age spline 80+ –0.2429 0.0390 –0.2841 0.0382
Age spline 90+ –0.0974 0.0501 –0.0771 0.0539
Health measure (y):
Latent health (Enters with weight normalized to 1)
Covariates (β): Age 0.4610 0.0434 –0.2421 0.0162
Age spline 60+ –0.2504 0.0573 0.0627 0.0299
Age spline 70+ –0.0694 0.0431 0.0631 0.0383
Age spline 80+ 0.1837 0.0374 –0.0701 0.0381
Age spline 90+ 0.0325 0.0496 0.0202 0.0580
Other 4 ordered logit cut points constant
Mortality (m):
Baseline (α) –6.8642 0.0846 –8.0584 0.0905
Latent health (δ) –1.0721 0.0163 –0.4387 0.0055
Number individuals 25,497 25,050
Number observations (health) 103,250 88,798
Number parameters 18 15
Log-likelihood –150,438.0 –60,269.9
Fig. 4.5 Survival probabilities—simulation versus life tablesslightly higher than the numbers from the life tables. This might be because
the HRS samples only individuals who are initially noninstitutionalized.
Both health and disability are strongly related to mortality, as shown in
ﬁgure 4.6. The ﬁgure shows this relationship by comparing future survival
probabilities conditional on self-reported health (or disability) at the age of
ﬁfty. The diﬀerences are striking: for example, only 48.5 percent of re-
spondents who report poor health at age ﬁfty survive until age seventy,
whereas 91.6 percent of those reporting excellent health at age ﬁfty survive
until age seventy. A similar pattern is revealed with respect to work dis-
ability.
Two technical aspects of ﬁgure 4.6 are noteworthy. First, the inner and
outer 95 percent conﬁdence bands represented by the two lines for each of
the three simulations are very close to each other, indicating a rather pre-
cise ﬁt. We therefore will not show conﬁdence bands in the sequel of this
chapter. Second, and as shown in ﬁgure 4.5, the unconditional simulation
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the actual life tables.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the selection eﬀect induced by diﬀerential mortal-
ity. The ﬁgure shows the distribution of the unobserved component a of la-
tent health given survival to selected ages. (These are weighted kernel-
density estimates and are scaled by survival probabilities, so that the curves
integrate to the share of surviving population at the respective ages.) Those
who are in the left part of the distributions with relatively poor latent
health are more likely to be selected out, so the distribution shifts to the
right with the survival age.
To simplify the presentation of simulated paths of health (or disability)
we collapse the ﬁve point scale of self-reported health into two groups—
good or better and fair or poor. Figure 4.8 shows three diﬀerent health or
disability paths. Part a pertains to the proportion of the population in fair
or poor health, from age ﬁfty to age one hundred. Part b pertains to the
proportion of the population that reports a work disability. The path la-
beled unconditional pathshows the hypothetical path of fair or poor health
(or work disability) if there were no deaths; or perhaps more meaningful,
it shows the path of poor health in the surviving population if poor health
and mortality were independent. Because persons in poor health have a
much higher mortality rate than persons in good health, health of the sur-
viving population is much better than the hypothetical health shown by the
unconditional path. The path labeled survivors shows poor health among
persons who survive to a given age. The diﬀerence between the uncondi-
tional path and the survivor path represents the selection eﬀect—persons
in poor health are more likely to die and thus are less likely to be in the
sample at older ages.
Figure 4.8 also shows the actual proportion of persons in poor health (or
disabled), based on self-reported health (or disability) responses among
persons of a given age in the HRS. Of course, the survey can only interview
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tsurvivors. The path determined by the actual response at each age is also
shown in the ﬁgure. If the model represents an appropriate description of
poor health and mortality, and their dependence, the simulated poor health
path for the surviving population should correspond closely to the actual
self-reported poor health levels of persons who survived to a given age. Fig-
ure 4.8 shows that the two paths correspond very closely for both poor
health and for work disability. Only at very old ages do the two paths diverge
noticeably. The actual data at these older ages is very sparse, however.
Because of the mortality selection, the survival of a respondent provides
information about the person’s health at younger ages. The model can be
used to simulate the health status at earlier ages of persons who survive to
a given age. Figure 4.9 shows the simulated evolution of health (or disabil-
ity), conditional on survival to at least age eighty, or to at least age ninety.
Because of the strong relationship between health and mortality and the
large intertemporal correlation of health, the two conditional paths diﬀer
substantially. To understand the relationship, consider the four poor-
health paths shown in ﬁgure 4.9. The unconditional path and the survivor
path are the same as those shown in ﬁgure 4.8. The proportion of all per-
sons who are in poor or fair health at age ﬁfty is about 0.18, as shown by
the “survivors” path. The proportion of persons who are in poor health at
age ﬁfty among those who will survive until age eighty is about 0.09. Of
those who survive until age ninety, the proportion in bad health at age ﬁfty
is only about 0.06. The proportions with respect to disability are similar to
those for health—about 0.16, 0.08, and 0.05, respectively.
Perhaps more striking is the comparison of health at age eighty of per-
sons who survive until at least eighty with the health at age eighty of those
who survive until at least ninety. At age eighty, about 40 percent of persons
who survive until at least eighty are in poor health. On the other hand, only
about 20 percent of persons who survive until at least age ninety are in poor
health at age eighty. A comparable comparison for disability shows similar
values.
The model could also be used to simulate more detailed information
about the health status at younger ages of persons who survive to a given
age, like the distribution over all health states at age ﬁfty.
What does self-reported health status tell us about underlying latent
health? Figure 4.10shows the distribution of latent health at age ﬁfty, given
self-reported health at age ﬁfty. The distribution of latent health is very
diﬀerent, depending on self-reported health status. Panel a of ﬁgure 4.10
shows the distribution of latent health for persons who reported they were
in poor health and for persons who reported they were in excellent health.
These distributions hardly overlap. The diﬀerent distributions, together
with the high persistence of latent health over time, generate substantial
persistence of health outcomes.
The distributions conditional on disability are somewhat diﬀerent. The
Pathways to Disability: Predicting Health Trajectories 137F
i
g
.
 
4
.
9
H
e
a
l
t
h
 
p
a
t
h
s
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
o
n
 
s
u
r
v
i
v
a
l
 
t
o
 
a
g
e
 
8
0
 
a
n
d
 
9
0F
i
g
.
 
4
.
1
0
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
l
a
t
e
n
t
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
a
t
 
a
g
e
 
5
0distribution of latent health for persons who report a work disability at age
ﬁfty is clearly over the left tail of the distribution of latent health for all per-
sons at age ﬁfty. But knowing that a person reports no disability at age ﬁfty
provides only limited information to distinguish this group from all per-
sons at age ﬁfty. The distribution of latent health for the no-disability group
is only slightly to the right of the distribution of latent health for all per-
sons. The reason is that at age ﬁfty most respondents classify themselves in
the no-disability group, and thus there can be little diﬀerence between the
no-disability group and all respondents.
Figure 4.11 shows future health (and disability) conditional on self-
reported health at age ﬁfty. Conditional on self-reported health, two paths
are shown—one for all persons that does not account for selection due to
mortality, and one for survivors. Panel a of ﬁgure 4.11 shows the propor-
tion in poor or fair health. Panel b of ﬁgure 4.11 shows the proportion with
a work disability. Note that because of self-reported classiﬁcation errors,
the health path for those who report they are in poor health at age ﬁfty does
not start at zero. And the path for those who say they are in excellent health
does not start at 1. A similar explanation pertains to the work disability
paths.
Self-reported health is highly persistent—the two paths converge only
slowly. Consider the two survivor paths. Until age seventy or eighty the two
paths remain far apart. The paths only start to converge rapidly after age
ninety. For persons surviving until age 100, the mortality selection eﬀect
leaves survivors with approximately the same health status at age 100, no
matter what their reported health status at age ﬁfty. (The selection eﬀect is
much less pronounced for persons with excellent initial health. The paths
of the total and the surviving population diverge more slowly for this group
than for the group with poor reported health at age ﬁfty.) For work dis-
ability, the results are similar. Persistence with respect to disability, how-
ever, is not as strong as persistence with respect to poor versus excellent
health. This is because poor and excellent health at age ﬁfty are very dis-
tinct outcomes, which contain signiﬁcant information about latent health,
as shown in ﬁgure 4.10. Work disability versus no work disability contains
less information, also shown in ﬁgure 4.10.
Figure 4.12, instead of showing the future path of persons conditional
on reported health at age ﬁfty (as in ﬁgure 4.11), shows the reverse paths
for persons who survive until at least age eighty and report their health sta-
tus at age eighty. The pure information about health provided by survival
through age eighty is shown in ﬁgure 4.9. Conditioning on reported health
at age eighty obviously also conditions on survival to at least age eighty.
Survival to age eighty and health status at age eighty may provide counter-
vailing information, however. Survival is good news; bad health is bad
news. Bad self-reported poor health at age eighty outweighs the good in-
formation on survival through age eighty. Back-casting SRH from age
140 Florian Heiss, Axel Börsch-Supan, Michael Hurd, and David A. WiseF
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0eighty to age ﬁfty, the unconditional poor health risk at ﬁfty is 17.8 percent.
Conditional on survival to age eighty, the likelihood of poor health de-
creases to 10 percent. Of those who survive until age eighty and report poor
health at age eighty, 20.3 percent are simulated to be in poor or fair health
at age ﬁfty. Of those who survive to age eighty and report excellent health at
age eighty, only 2.1 percent are predicted to be in poor or fair health at age
ﬁfty.
On the other hand, information about work disability at age eighty, given
survival to at least age eighty, provides little information about disability
status at age ﬁfty, as suggested by ﬁgure 4.10.
4.6.2 Simulations: Conditioning on Sociodemographic Characteristics
In addition to the model in which we only conditioned on age, we esti-
mate a model for SRH with additional covariates—gender, race, and edu-
cation and also interactions of these variables with age—in the latent
health and the self-reported health outcome equations. Table 4.19 shows
the parameter estimates. Note that the covariates enter both the latent
health equation and the SRH equation. Thus, the covariates in the SRH
equation capture the additional eﬀects on SRH that are not captured by la-
tent health (which also enters the SRH equation). Females have higher la-
tent health (a lower mortality risk) at age ﬁfty, and this eﬀect increases at
higher ages.7 On the other hand, given latent health (mortality risk), the
SRH of women is much worse. This might be due to diﬀerent response
scales or diﬀerent health conditions, such as arthritis, that aﬀect subjective
health status more than mortality. Respondents have a higher latent health
and report better SRH given latent health.
Figure 4.13 shows the relative mortality hazards for males versus fe-
males, nonwhite versus white respondents, and low- versus high-education
respondents. While the mortality risk of males relative to females is more
or less constant over all ages, mortality diﬀerences by race and education
diminish at older ages. This apparently results from the mortality selection
eﬀect, with those in better health more likely to survive until older ages no
matter what their race or education.
The next three ﬁgures show the likelihood of fair or poor SRH (some-
times referred to as poor health) by gender, race, and education, respec-
tively. Figure 4.14 shows health paths by gender. The paths labeled “male”
and “female” show unconditional health paths of men and women. The
paths labeled “male survivors” and “female survivors” show the health of
the survivors and account for the strong relationship between poor health
and mortality. At age ﬁfty, both men and women report about the same
level of poor health. As discussed previously, latent health is better for
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7. The variable age is actual age minus ﬁfty.women, but SRH conditional on latent health is worse. On balance, these
two eﬀects roughly cancel out. Poor health increases more rapidly for men
than for women, as shown by the “male” and “female” paths. On the other
hand, selection due to mortality is greater for men than for women, and
more men than women reporting poor health leave the sample. Thus the
self-reported health of men and women survivors is about the same
through age eighty-ﬁve. After age eighty-ﬁve, the health of women is worse
than the health of men. This results entirely from diﬀerential mortality.
Figure 4.15 shows poor health by race. The ﬁgure shows poor health
paths for white and African American men with twelve years of education.
At age ﬁfty, African Americans are much more likely than whites to be in
poor health. Through age seventy, the slopes of the poor health paths (not
accounting for mortality) for African American and for white respondents
are about the same, but mortality is much higher for African Americans.
Thus, the paths for African American and white survivors converge. As
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Table 4.19 Estimation results with age and sociodemographics
Latent health (h) SRH
Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error
Latent Health (h):
Standard deviation of a (σ) 2.9894 0.0386
1-year correlation of a (ρ) 0.9787 0.0006
Covariates (γ): Age –0.4844 0.0319 0.4130 0.0299
Age spline 60+ 0.2228 0.0422 –0.1717 0.0413
Age spline 70+ –0.0164 0.0415 –0.0589 0.0402
Age spline 80+ –0.2369 0.0368 0.1713 0.0351
Age spline 90+ –0.1028 0.0464 0.0549 0.0470
Female 1.0897 0.2388 –1.3104 0.2282
Education 0.2128 0.0385 0.1883 0.0358
Nonwhite –2.6672 0.2768 1.1884 0.2626
Hispanic 0.0114 0.4468 –0.5425 0.4222
Female * age 0.0277 0.0083 –0.0027 0.0080
Education * age –0.0033 0.0012 –0.0023 0.0012
Nonwhite * age 0.0586 0.0104 –0.0377 0.0099
Hispanic * age 0.0118 0.0167 0.0064 0.0155
Other 4 ordered logit cut points
Mortality (m):
Baseline (α) –5.8253 0.1904
Latent health (δ) –0.3541 0.0039
Number individuals 25,497
Number observations (health) 103,250
Number parameters 34
Log-likelihood –148,652.8Fig. 4.13 Relative mortality hazards
Fig. 4.14 Poor health by gender
Note: All simulations are for white respondents with twelve years of education.shown in ﬁgure 4.15, the mortality diﬀerences between African Americans
and whites diminish at older ages. On the other hand, the true poor health
paths start to converge after age seventy. Thus, the poor health paths of
survivors remain roughly parallel at older ages, with poor health more
likely for African Americans than for whites.
Figure 4.16 shows poor health paths by education level—eight years of
schooling (low education) and sixteen years (high education). At age ﬁfty,
the likelihood of poor health for the low-education group is about four
times as high as for the high-education group. The true poor health levels
of the two groups increase in parallel to about age seventy and thereafter
the true poor health levels of the two groups start to converge. In addition,
as shown in ﬁgure 4.15, the diﬀerence between the mortality rates of the
two groups declines at older ages. Thus, the diﬀerence in the poor health
levels of low- and high-education survivors starts to converge after age sev-
enty, although the poor health level of the low-education group remains
substantially higher than for the high-education group.
4.7 Conclusions
To help understand pathways to disability, we have explored the rela-
tionship between health (and disability) at younger ages and health (and
disability) at older ages. In particular, we developed an econometric model
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Fig. 4.15 Poor health by race
Note: All simulations are for male respondents with twelve years of education.designed to take account of three key features of the data that characterize
the health and disability of persons as they age:
• State dependence: all past states directly aﬀect the risk of a current bad
state.
• Heterogeneity: past states contain information on the individual risk
that is correlated over time.
• Misclassiﬁcation: categorical coding of self-reported health and dis-
ability induces classiﬁcation errors.
The key idea of the model is to consider true underlying health status, spec-
iﬁed as a continuous latent variable. The categorical self-assessed indica-
tors of health (or work disability) are determined by this latent health. The
underlying continuous latent health variable is correlated over time and
thus induces correlation over time in the observed responses to the cate-
gorical self-assessment of health status and disability. In addition, the
probability of death is assumed to depend on the hidden latent health mea-
sure, thus allowing for correlation between health status and selection into
the group of persons who survive from one period to the next.
The analysis is based on the four cohorts of the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS, AHEAD, CODA, and WB). We used the econometric model
to simulate future mortality and the future health and disability paths of
survivors, conditional on health or disability at younger ages (age ﬁfty).
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Fig. 4.16 Poor health by education
Note: All simulations are for white male respondents.We ﬁnd that health and work disability correspond very closely (in the
HRS data). We ﬁnd a very strong relationship between health and disabil-
ity and mortality. We ﬁnd that future paths of health and disability are very
strongly related to health and disability at age ﬁfty. Reversing the process,
we ﬁnd that survival to older ages (eighty or ninety) provides substantial
information about health and disability status at younger ages.
In addition, the interplay between health and mortality of persons as
they age can be studied in detail using simulations based on the economet-
ric model. For example, at age ﬁfty, the poor health level of persons with
eight or fewer years of education is about four times as high as the poor
health level of those with sixteen or more years of education. The true poor
health levels of the two groups increase in parallel to about age seventy and
thereafter the true poor health levels of the two groups start to converge.
But the diﬀerence between the mortality rates of the two groups declines at
older ages. Thus the diﬀerence in the poor health levels of low- and high-
education survivors starts to converge after age seventy, although the poor
health level for the low-education group remains substantially higher than
the level for the high-education group. Similar decomposition of mortality
and poor health is presented by race and by gender.
To date, we have used only a few individual socioeconomic attributes in
the model. Many more attributes, such as speciﬁc medical conditions,
could be incorporated in the model. The onset of particular medical con-
ditions could be held to explain, for example, the diﬀerences between the
health and disability paths of low-education and high-education groups or
the diﬀerences between the health and disability paths by race or ethnic
group. Such analysis may also help to understand how future medical tech-
nology may change the prevalence of disability.
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